Constitution of the United States/Art. I/Sec. 8/Clause 14 Land and Naval Forces Rules
Article I Legislative Branch
Section 8 Enumerated Powers
Clause 14 Land and Naval Forces Rules
| Clause Text |
|---|
| To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; |
Care of Armed Forces[edit | edit source]
Scope of the congressional and executive authority to prescribe the rules for the governance of the military is broad and subject to great deference by the Judiciary. The Supreme Court recognizes "that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society," that "[t]he military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian," and that "Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and with greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by which [military society] shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules for [civilian society]."[1] Denying that Congress or military authorities are free to disregard the Constitution when acting in this area,[2] the Court nonetheless operates with "a healthy deference to legislative and executive judgments" about military affairs,[3] so that, while constitutional guarantees apply, "the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections."[4]
In reliance upon this deference to congressional judgment about the roles of the sexes in combat and the necessities of military mobilization, coupled with express congressional consideration of the precise questions, the Court sustained as constitutional the legislative judgment to provide for registration of males only for possible future conscription.[5] Emphasizing the unique, separate status of the military, the necessity to indoctrinate men in obedience and discipline, the tradition of military neutrality in political affairs, and the need to protect troop morale, the Court upheld the validity of military post regulations, backed by congressional enactments, banning speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature and the distribution of literature without prior approval of post headquarters, with the commander authorized to keep out only those materials that would clearly endanger the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base.[6] On the same basis, the Court rejected challenges on constitutional and statutory grounds to military regulations requiring servicemen to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on base, in the context of circulations of petitions for presentation to Congress.[7] And the statements of a military officer urging disobedience to certain orders could be punished under provisions that would have been of questionable validity in a civilian context.[8] Reciting the considerations previously detailed, the Court has refused to allow enlisted men and officers to sue to challenge or set aside military decisions and actions.[9]
Congress has a plenary and exclusive power to determine the age at which a soldier or seaman shall serve, the compensation he shall be allowed, and the service to which he shall be assigned. This power may be exerted to supersede parents' control of minor sons who are needed for military service. Where the statute requiring the consent of parents for enlistment of a minor son did not permit such consent to be qualified, their attempt to impose a condition that the son carry war risk insurance for the benefit of his mother was not binding on the government.[10] Because the possession of government insurance payable to the person of his choice is calculated to enhance the morale of the serviceman, Congress may permit him to designate any beneficiary he desires, irrespective of state law, and may exempt the proceeds from the claims of creditors.[11] Likewise, Congress may bar a state from taxing the tangible, personal property of a soldier, assigned for duty in the state, but domiciled elsewhere.[12] To safeguard the health and welfare of the armed forces, Congress may authorize the suppression of bordellos in the vicinity of the places where forces are stationed.[13]
Trial and Punishment of Servicemen (Courts-Martial)[edit | edit source]
Under its power to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces, Congress has set up a system of criminal law binding on all servicemen, with its own substantive laws, its own courts and procedures, and its own appeals procedure.[14]
Although courts have disagreed about using courts-martial to try servicemen for nonmilitary offenses,[15] the matter became important during the Cold War period when the United States found it essential to maintain, both at home and abroad, a large standing army in which great numbers of servicemen were draftees. In O'Callahan v. Parker,[16] the Supreme Court held that courts-martial did not have jurisdiction to try servicemen charged with a crime that was not "service connected." While the Court did not define "service connection," it noted that the serviceman committed the crime off-base when he was lawfully off duty against a civilian in peacetime in the United States.[17] In Solorio v. United States,[18] the Court discussed O'Callahan, holding that "the requirements of the Constitution are not violated where . . . a court-martial is convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the armed services at the time of the offense charged."[19] Chief Justice William Rehnquist's opinion for the Court stated that O'Callahan had been based on erroneous readings of English and American history, and that "the service connection approach . . . has proved confusing and difficult for military courts to apply."[20]
How the Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees apply to court-martial trials is not clear. The Fifth Amendment expressly excepts "[c]ases arising in the land and naval forces" from its grand jury provision, and there cases may also be excepted from the Sixth Amendment.[21] The double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment appears to apply, however.[22] The Court of Military Appeals now holds that servicemen are entitled to all constitutional rights except those that expressly or by implication do not apply to the military.[23] The Uniform Code of Military Justice, supplemented by the Manual for Courts-Martial, affirmatively grants due process rights roughly comparable to civilian procedures.[24] However, the Code leaves intact much of the traditional structure of courts-martial, including the possibility of command influence,[25] and the Court of Military Appeals scope of review is limited,[26] thus creating areas of potential constitutional challenges.
Upholding Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Court in Parker v. Levy stressed the special status of military society.[27] This difference has resulted in a military code that regulates aspects of military members' conduct that civilian governments do not regulate. In addition, the military code imposes penalties ranging from severe to below those possible in civilian life. Because of these factors, the Court, while agreeing that constitutional limitations apply to military justice, reasoned that the standards of constitutional guarantees were significantly different in the military. Thus, the Court held the vagueness challenge to UCMJ Articles 133 and 134 to be governed by the standard applied to criminal statutes regulating economic affairs--the most lenient of vagueness standards.[28] Applying USMJ Articles 133 and 134 to conduct essentially composed of speech did not require voiding the conviction, as the speech was unprotected, and, even if the Articles might reach protected speech, the officer in the instant case was unable to raise that issue.[29]
The Court has recognized that military courts are not Article III courts, but are agencies established pursuant to Article I.[30] In the nineteenth century, the Court established that the civil courts have no power to interfere with courts-martial and that court-martial decisions are not subject to civil court review.[31] The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari military commission proceedings until August 1, 1984, when Congress conferred appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Military Appeals.[32] Prior to that time, civil court review of court-martial decisions was possible through habeas corpus jurisdiction,[33] an avenue that continues to exist, but the Court severely limited the scope of such review, restricting it to whether the court-martial has jurisdiction over the person tried and the offense charged.[34] In Burns v. Wilson,[35] however, several Justices appeared to suggest that civil courts on habeas corpus could review claims of due process violations by military courts. Since Burns, the Court has thrown little light on the range of issues cognizable by a federal court in such litigation[36] and the lower federal courts have divided several possible ways.[37]
Trial and Punishment of Civilians and Dependents (Courts-Martial)[edit | edit source]
Over the years, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of persons Congress may constitutionally subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice under its Clause 14 powers. In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, the Court held that an honorably discharged former soldier, charged with having committed murder during military service in Korea, could not be tried by court-martial but, under the Constitution, could be charged in federal court.[38] In Reid v. Covert, the Court, after initially upholding the constitutionality of court-martial jurisdiction,[39] reached the opposite conclusion on rehearing, holding that court-martial jurisdiction was lacking, at least in peacetime, to try civilian dependents of service personnel for capital crimes committed outside the United States.[40] Subsequently, the Court extended its ruling to civilian dependents overseas charged with noncapital crimes[41] and to civilian employees of the military charged with either capital or noncapital crimes.[42]
- ↑ Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-52 (1974). See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746-48 (1975); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 45-46 (1976); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353-58 (1980); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-68 (1981).
- ↑ Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981).
- ↑ 453 U.S. at 66. "[P]erhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference." Id. at 64-65. See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
- ↑ Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). "[T]he tests and limitations [of the Constitution] to be applied may differ because of the military context." Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981).
- ↑ Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
- ↑ Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), limiting Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972).
- ↑ Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453 (1980). The statutory challenge was based on 10 U.S.C. § 1034, which protects the right of members of the armed forces to communicate with a Member of Congress, but which the Court interpreted narrowly.
- ↑ Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
- ↑ Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (enlisted men charging racial discrimination by their superiors in duty assignments and performance evaluations could not bring constitutional tort suits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (officer who had been an unwitting, unconsenting subject of an Army experiment to test the effects of LSD on human subjects could not bring a constitutional tort action for damages). These considerations are also the basis of the Court's construction of the Federal Tort Claims Act as not reaching injuries arising incident to military service. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). In United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987), four Justices urged reconsideration of Feres, but that has not occurred.
- ↑ United States v. Williams, 302 U.S. 46 (1937). See also In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890); In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890).
- ↑ Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981). In the absence of express congressional language, like that found in Wissner, the Court nonetheless held that a state court division under its community property system of an officer's military retirement benefits conflicted with the federal program and could not stand. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). See also Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962) (exemption from creditors' claims of disability benefits deposited by a veteran's guardian in a savings and loan association).
- ↑ Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953). See also California v. Buzard, 382 U.S. 386 (1966); Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
- ↑ McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919).
- ↑ The Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950, 64 Stat. 107, as amended by the Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1335, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. For prior acts, see 12 Stat. 736 (1863); 39 Stat. 650 (1916). See also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (in context of the death penalty under the UCMJ). The same power that authorized Congress to promulgate the Uniform Code of Military Justice--granted by this Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause--also authorized Congress to make a civil registration requirement a consequence of certain military crime convictions. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 395 (2013) (holding that the Military Regulation and Necessary and Proper Clauses authorized Congress to make civil registration a consequence of a servicemember's federal sex offence conviction).
- ↑ Compare Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441-47 (1987) (majority opinion), with id. at 456-61 (dissenting opinion), and O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 268-72 (1969) (majority opinion), with id. at 276-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Robert Duke & Howard Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 435 (1960).
- ↑ 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
- ↑ 395 U.S. at 273-74. See also Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973).
- ↑ 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
- ↑ 483 U.S. at 450-51.
- ↑ 483 U.S. at 448. Although the Court of Military Appeals had affirmed Solorio's military-court conviction on the basis that the service-connection test had been met, the Court elected to reconsider and overrule O'Callahan altogether.
- ↑ Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123, 138-39 (1866); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942). The matter was raised but left unresolved in Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
- ↑ See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). Cf. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
- ↑ United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960); United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). This conclusion by the Court of Military Appeals is at least questioned and perhaps disapproved in Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43-48 (1976), in the course of overturning a CMA rule that counsel was required in summary court-martial. For the CMA's response to the holding, see United States v. Booker, 5 M. J. 238 (C.M.A. 1977), rev'd in part on reh., 5 M. J. 246 (C.M.A. 1978).
- ↑ The UCMJ guarantees counsel, protection from self-incrimination and double jeopardy, and warnings of rights prior to interrogation, to name a few.
- ↑ Cf. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1969).
- ↑ 10 U.S.C. § 867.
- ↑ 417 U.S. 733 (1974). Article 133 punishes a commissioned officer for "conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman," and Article 134 punishes any person subject to the Code for "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces."
- ↑ 417 U.S. at 756.
- ↑ 417 U.S. at 757-61.
- ↑ Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858). Judges of Article I courts do not have the independence conferred by security of tenure and of compensation.
- ↑ Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
- ↑ Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393, 28 U.S.C. § 1259 . See also Ortiz v. United States, No. 16-1423, slip op. 5-19 (U.S. 2018) (affirming the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).
- ↑ Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879). While federal courts have jurisdiction to intervene in military court proceedings prior to judgment, as a matter of equity, following the standards applicable to federal court intervention in state criminal proceedings, they should act when the petitioner has not exhausted his military remedies only in extraordinary circumstances. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
- ↑ Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496 (1900); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
- ↑ 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
- ↑ Cf. Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583 (1957); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 350 n.3, 351 (1969); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
- ↑ E.g., Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir., 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
- ↑ 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (stating that it is within Congress's power to make former soldiers who are no longer subject to the military code subject to federal jurisdiction). Explaining the rationale for courts-martial, the Court noted: "Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within the military ranks there is need for prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience and order. But Army discipline will not be improved by court-martialing rather than trying by jury some civilian ex-soldier who has been wholly separated from the service for months, years or perhaps decades." Id. at 22. See also Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
- ↑ See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
- ↑ Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (voiding court-martial convictions of two women for murdering their soldier husbands stationed in Japan). No majority of Justices in Reid agreed on the extent to which Congress's power under Clause 14 could reach civilians. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, and William Brennan were of the opinion Congress's power under Clause 14 could not reach civilians at all. Justices Felix Frankfurter and John Harlan concurred as to the result, but expressed the more limited view that Clause 14 cannot justify the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents in capital cases in peacetime.
- ↑ Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (voiding court-martial conviction for noncapital crime committed overseas by civilian wife of soldier). The majority could see no reason for distinguishing between capital and noncapital crimes. Justices Harlan and Frankfurter dissented on the ground that in capital cases greater constitutional protection, available in civil courts, was required.
- ↑ Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
