Section 1983 Litigation/Relationship Between Individual and Municipal Liability
Bifurcation[edit | edit source]
When § 1983 claims are brought against both a state or local official individually and a municipal entity, the district court has discretion to either bifurcate the claim or try them jointly.[1] Section 1983 plaintiffs generally favor a joint trial because the plaintiff may be allowed to introduce evidence of wrongdoing by other officers or by the municipal entity, albeit with limiting instructions. Section 1983 defendants normally seek bifurcation in order to thwart this strategy.
Los Angeles v. Heller[edit | edit source]
In Los Angeles v. Heller,[2] the plaintiff asserted § 1983 false arrest and excessive force claims; the complaint alleged personal capacity and municipal liability claims. The Supreme Court held that a determination in the first phase that the individual officer did not violate the plaintiff’s federally protected rights required dismissal of the municipal liability claim. The Court reasoned that, because the municipal liability claim was premised on the city’s allegedly having adopted a policy of condoning excessive force in making arrests, the city could not be liable under § 1983 unless some official violated the plaintiff’s federally protected rights under the alleged “policy.”[3]
Circuit Court Applications of Heller[edit | edit source]
Although the early post-Heller cases read Heller broadly as meaning that if the personal-capacity claim is dismissed, the municipal liability claim must be dismissed,[4] several of the more recent decisions recognized situations in which the named subordinate defendant did not violate the plaintiff’s federally protected rights, but the plaintiff’s rights were violated by the joint action of a group of officers, or by a nondefendant, or by policy-making officials.[5] Under these circumstances, dismissal of the claim against the individual officer–defendant should not result in automatic dismissal of the municipal liability claim.
Officer Protected by Qualified Immunity Does Not Necessarily Require Dismissal of Municipal Liability Claim[edit | edit source]
The fact that the plaintiff’s claim against the individual officer–defendant is defeated by qualified immunity should not automatically result in dismissal against the municipality, because an officer who is protected by qualified immunity may have violated the plaintiff’s federally protected rights. The qualified immunity determination may mean only that the defendant did not violate the plaintiff’s clearly established federally protected rights.[6] An official sued in his personal capacity may assert qualified immunity; a municipal entity may not.
Plaintiff Need Not Sue Both Officer and Municipality[edit | edit source]
There is no requirement in § 1983 law that the plaintiff sue both the officer in a personal capacity and the municipality. The plaintiff may choose to sue only the officer, or only the municipality.[7] When the plaintiff does not sue both the officer and municipality, Heller issues do not arise.
If Plaintiff Prevails on Personal-Capacity Claim[edit | edit source]
If the plaintiff is awarded relief on her personal-capacity claim, should the district court nevertheless allow her to proceed on her municipal liability claim? The majority view is that once the plaintiff obtains complete relief on her personal-capacity claim, it is unnecessary for the court to proceed with the municipal liability claim.[8] In other words, because the plaintiff achieved the objective of her suit, there is no reason to allow it to proceed further. The Second Circuit, however, held that when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages against the officer on the personal-capacity claim, the plaintiff cannot relitigate the issue of compensatory damages for the constitutional violation against the city, but is entitled to pursue his claim for nominal damages for the constitutional violation against the city.[9] The Second Circuit relied, in part, upon the societal importance of holding “a municipality accountable where official policy or custom has resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights.”[10]
“Cost Allocation Scheme”[edit | edit source]
The interplay of the rules governing qualified immunity and municipal liability results in a cost-allocation scheme among the municipality, the individual officer, and the plaintiff whose federally protected rights were violated. The Supreme Court, in Owen v. City of Independence,[11] explained how the “costs” are allocated:
- The municipality will be held liable for compensatory damages when the violation of the plaintiff’s federally protected right is attributable to enforcement of a municipal policy or practice.
- The individual officer will be held liable for compensatory damages when she violated the plaintiff’s clearly established, federally protected right and, therefore, she is not shielded by qualified immunity.
- The plaintiff whose federally protected right was violated will not be entitled to monetary recovery, and will “absorb the loss” when the violation of her right is not attributable to the enforcement of a municipal policy or practice, and the individual officer did not violate plaintiff’s clearly established federal rights.[12]
References[edit | edit source]
- ↑ Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). See, e.g., Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999).
- ↑ 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
- ↑ Id. at 796–99.
- ↑ See, e.g., Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988).
- ↑ See Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 643 (2010) (detainee denial of medical care case; holding jury verdict exonerating individual jail medical technicians, but imposing liability against county, was not inconsistent; rejecting county’s argument that individual officer liability required to impose municipal liability; “The actual rule . . . is much narrower: a municipality can be held liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such a finding would create an inconsistent verdict.” This depends on “the nature of the constitutional violation, the theory of municipal liability, and the defenses set forth” (citing Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2002)). Based on the district court’s jury instructions, “the jury could have found that [the medical technicians] were not deliberately indifferent to [the detainee’s] medical needs, but simply could not respond adequately because of the well-documented breakdowns in the County’s policies for retrieving medical request forms.”); Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 2009) (“There need not be a finding that a municipal employee is liable in his or her individual capacity before municipal liability can attach.”) (citations omitted). See also Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2002); Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2002); Barrett v. Orange Cnty., 194 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1999); Anderson v. Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 686 (11th Cir. 1985); Garcia v. Salt Lake Cnty., 768 F.2d 303, 310 (10th Cir. 1985).
- ↑ See, e.g., Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F.3d 248, 252–54 (2d Cir. 2013); Int’l Ground Transp., Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean City, Md., 475 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2007) (determination that individual officer/defendants are protected from liability by qualified immunity does not preclude imposition of municipal liability); Prue v. City of Syracuse, 26 F.3d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1994); Doe v. Sullivan Cnty., 956 F.2d 545, 554 (6th Cir.) (“dismissal of a claim against an officer asserting qualified immunity in no way logically entails that the plaintiff suffered no constitutional deprivation, nor . . . that a municipality . . . may not be liable for that deprivation”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 864 (1992). See also Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that ruling defendant-officer is protected by qualified immunity does not preclude municipal liability). However, if the defendant officer was protected by qualified immunity because she did not violate the plaintiff’s federal rights, and there is no finding that any other officers violated plaintiff’s rights, the municipality would be entitled to judgment.
- ↑ Askins, 727 F.3d at 253 (recognizing § 1983 plaintiff may choose to sue only municipality; she need not name official as defendant).
- ↑ Manzanares v. City of Albuquerque, 628 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2010); Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2006); George v. City of Long Beach, 973 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1992).
- ↑ Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 1999).
- ↑ Id. at 317.
- ↑ 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
- ↑ Id. at 657.
