Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases (Aspen Casebook)
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Introduction to the Competition Model[edit | edit source]
Policies and Goals of Antitrust Regulation[edit | edit source]
Common Law[edit | edit source]
Framework for Analysis[edit | edit source]
Economic Problem[edit | edit source]
Market in Movement[edit | edit source]
Judicial Emphasis on Economic Reasoning[edit | edit source]
Special Problems of Antitrust Enforcement[edit | edit source]
Enforcement[edit | edit source]
Direct Purchaser[edit | edit source]
Generally, only the "direct purchaser" may have standing to sue for antitrust injury. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, an indirect purchaser of concrete blocks attempted to sue the manufacturer of the blocks. The blocks had come to the purchaser through two levels in the supply chain. The indirect purchaser was found to not have been injured by the alleged antitrust violations.
One policy rationale behind the direct purchaser requirement is that there are many indirect purchasers compared to the number of direct purchasers, which spreads out the damage more. Less damage per purchaser spells out less incentive to sue for recovery than the direct, larger-volume purchaser has.
Antitrust Injury[edit | edit source]
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. tells us that antitrust injury must come "'by reason of' that which made the acquisitions unlawful." What makes the acquisition unlawful is injury to competition.
The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be “the type of loss that claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.”
"Business or Property[edit | edit source]
A plaintiff suing for antitrust recovery under section 4 of the Clayton Act must allege injury to "business or property." Sometimes this means that plaintiff must have an injury to a "commercial injury." In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the defendant argued that "business or property" means only commercial business (commercial interests or enterprises), but the holding said that "business or property" means personal property or interest as well.
Standing to Sue[edit | edit source]
For one to have standing, a nexus must exist between the plaintiff's harm and the alleged violation. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready describes that the court looks for a physical and economic connection between the violation alleged and the harm caused. There are several Factors of importance:
- If the injury plaintiff suffered was inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters lays out more factors that will help determine if the plaintiff has standing or not:
- Causal connection between alleged violation and harm to plaintiff
- Whether or not the defendant had improper motive
- Whether injury is that which Congress wanted to stop
- Directness of asserted injury
- Speculative nature of relationship between the alleged antitrust violation and the alleged injury
- Risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages