Sedmak v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc.: Difference between revisions
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|subject=Contracts | |subject=Contracts | ||
|appealed_from= | |appealed_from= | ||
| | |case_treatment=No | ||
| | |overturned= | ||
| | |partially_overturned= | ||
| | |reaffirmed= | ||
|questioned= | |||
|criticized= | |||
|distinguished= | |||
* Sedmak (P) owned 6 Corvettes → car enthusiasts | |cited= | ||
|followed= | |||
|related= | |||
|facts=* Sedmak (P) owned 6 Corvettes → car enthusiasts | |||
* Magazine article published in 1977 in which Chevy announced it was producing 6,000 ltd. Corvettes → P asked Tom Kells, manager of Charlie’s Chevy (D) about availability of the car | * Magazine article published in 1977 in which Chevy announced it was producing 6,000 ltd. Corvettes → P asked Tom Kells, manager of Charlie’s Chevy (D) about availability of the car | ||
** Tom said he would check as he did not know, and if they were to receive one, P could purchase it | ** Tom said he would check as he did not know, and if they were to receive one, P could purchase it | ||
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** Said contract would be sent, but none ever was | ** Said contract would be sent, but none ever was | ||
* Late January 1978, no pace car still, allowed dealership to keep it in showroom until after Indy 500 | * Late January 1978, no pace car still, allowed dealership to keep it in showroom until after Indy 500 | ||
* Car arrived in April, Kells said they had to bid on the car and the price was way up due to demand → P sued for specific performance | * Car arrived in April, Kells said they had to bid on the car and the price was way up due to demand → P sued for specific performance | ||
|procedural_history=* Trial Court decreed specific performance; denied D’s contention that contract price was indefinite and that contract was valid under Statute of Frauds due to the receipt given to P → D appealed | |||
* Trial Court decreed specific performance; denied D’s contention that contract price was indefinite and that contract was valid under Statute of Frauds due to the receipt given to P → D appealed | |||
** Specific Performance lies within discretion of trial court → discretion is narrow; no adequate remedy at law for P due to uniqueness of car | ** Specific Performance lies within discretion of trial court → discretion is narrow; no adequate remedy at law for P due to uniqueness of car | ||
|issues=Is P entitled to specific performance on the oral contract with Charlie’s? | |||
|arguments= | |||
|holding=SATZ: Yes. | |||
|judgment=Affirmed. | |||
|reasons=# The nature of the appearance, mileage, and condition of the pace car fell within UCC 2-716(1) under “proper circumstance” as to grant specific performance | |||
# The nature of the appearance, mileage, and condition of the pace car fell within UCC 2-716(1) under “proper circumstance” as to grant specific performance | |||
## Short supply, great demand of care created the proper circumstance as well → it could not be recreated without considerable expense, delay, and inconvenience | ## Short supply, great demand of care created the proper circumstance as well → it could not be recreated without considerable expense, delay, and inconvenience | ||
## Failure to specify an exact selling price does not render the contract voidable | ## Failure to specify an exact selling price does not render the contract voidable | ||
## Because there was no dispute as to the quantity, part payment for a single indivisible commercial unit removed the oral contract from the Statute of Frauds | ## Because there was no dispute as to the quantity, part payment for a single indivisible commercial unit removed the oral contract from the Statute of Frauds | ||
## Ps had no adequate remedy at law and were entitled to specific performance | ## Ps had no adequate remedy at law and were entitled to specific performance | ||
|rule= | |||
|comments= | |||
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|Court_opinion_parts={{Court opinion part | |||
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|written_by=Satz | |||
|joined_by= | |||
}} | |||
}} |
Revision as of 03:17, September 12, 2020
Sedmak v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc. | |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
---|---|
Citation | 622 S.W.2d 694 (1981) |
Date decided | 1981 |
Case Opinions | |
written by Satz |
Facts
- Sedmak (P) owned 6 Corvettes → car enthusiasts
- Magazine article published in 1977 in which Chevy announced it was producing 6,000 ltd. Corvettes → P asked Tom Kells, manager of Charlie’s Chevy (D) about availability of the car
- Tom said he would check as he did not know, and if they were to receive one, P could purchase it
- January 1978, P puts $500 deposit on car → D gives receipt indicating such
- Special ordered with changes to stock options on car; confirmed and ordered by Kells
- Kells informed P approx. price was $15k, but was not sure exactly due to P’s changes to stock model
- Said contract would be sent, but none ever was
- Late January 1978, no pace car still, allowed dealership to keep it in showroom until after Indy 500
- Car arrived in April, Kells said they had to bid on the car and the price was way up due to demand → P sued for specific performance
Procedural History
- Trial Court decreed specific performance; denied D’s contention that contract price was indefinite and that contract was valid under Statute of Frauds due to the receipt given to P → D appealed
- Specific Performance lies within discretion of trial court → discretion is narrow; no adequate remedy at law for P due to uniqueness of car
Issues
Is P entitled to specific performance on the oral contract with Charlie’s?
Holding
SATZ: Yes.
Judgment
Affirmed.
Reasons
- The nature of the appearance, mileage, and condition of the pace car fell within UCC 2-716(1) under “proper circumstance” as to grant specific performance
- Short supply, great demand of care created the proper circumstance as well → it could not be recreated without considerable expense, delay, and inconvenience
- Failure to specify an exact selling price does not render the contract voidable
- Because there was no dispute as to the quantity, part payment for a single indivisible commercial unit removed the oral contract from the Statute of Frauds
- Ps had no adequate remedy at law and were entitled to specific performance