Contracts/Deviation: Difference between revisions
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The English common law of deviation is establish by two cases, Glynn v Margetson<ref>Glynn v Margetson 1893 AC351</ref> and Leduc v Ward <ref>Leduc v Ward 188820 QBD 475</ref>. | The English common law of deviation is establish by two cases, Glynn v Margetson<ref>Glynn v Margetson 1893 AC351</ref> and Leduc v Ward <ref>Leduc v Ward 188820 QBD 475</ref>. | ||
In | In Glynn v Margetson a vessel was to carry a perishable consignment of Seville marmalade oranges from Malaga to Liverpool. The contract included a "liberty clause" which allowed the vessel "liberty to proceed and stay at any ports in any rotation in the Mediterranean, Levant, Black sea or Adriatic, or on the coasts of Africa, Spain, Portugal or France.." On leaving Malaga, the vessel did not head straight for Liverpool, but made her way to Burriana, 350 miles up the coast. As a result of the delay, the cargo had deteriorated by the time it reached England. The [[Judicial functions of the House of Lords|House of Lords]] (establishing the so-called "main purpose rule", held that the clause, if given full effect, would defeat the main purpose of the contract and would be, in effect, an exemption clause which could be ignored. They gave the clause a limited construction, namely that the vessel could have liberty to proceed and stay at any ports on the voyage from Malaga to Liverpool, such as Cadiz or Lisbon.<ref> Cases & Materials on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd edition - Martin Dockray - ISBN1-85941-796-5</ref> | ||
In Leduc v Ward, a vessel was to voyage from Fiume (modern day Rijeka) to Dunkirk. The bill of lading gave "liberty to call at any ports in any order". She did not proceed to Dunkirk, but headed for Glasgow, and was lost in a storm near Ailsa Craig. Just as in Glynn v Margetson, the Court of Appeal held that the deviation was unjustifiable and was not permitted by the liberty clause, so the carrier was liable for the lost cargo. <ref> Cases & Materials on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd edition - Martin Dockray - ISBN1-85941-796-5</ref> (Had the court held that the deviation was justified, the carrier would have avoided liability as the storm would have been an "Act of God"). Even though it was accepted that the shipper had been verbally informed that the vessel might make passage to Glasgow, this evidence was not admissible, because the [[parol evidence rule]] prevents recourse to extraneous evidence when construing a written document. Using the criteria of differential bargaining strength of the parties, whereby the carrier is usually deemed to have greater bargaining power than the shipper, note that the parol evidence rule may be relaxed if a shipper (rather than the carrier) seeks to rely on any verbal promises of the carrier. | |||
==Insurance regarding voyages and shipment== | ==Insurance regarding voyages and shipment== | ||
Revision as of 08:43, December 21, 2013
Template:Contract law The doctrine of deviation is a particular aspect of contracts of carriage of goods by sea. A deviation is a departure from the "agreed route" or the "usual route", and it can amount to a serious a breach of contract The consequences of unjustified deviation are very grave for the carrier, who is thereby prevented from relying upon any exclusion clause which limits his liability.
Establishing the doctrine
Deviation in carriage of good by sea is treated as a serious breach because it undermines the carrier's prime duty to the shipper of the cargo, namely to gerry the cargo to its destination will "all due despatch".
The "agreed route" is identified from the contract of carriage, as evidenced by the [[bill of lading]. The ports of origin and destination (e.g. "Piraeus to Liverpool"') define the route. The "usual route" is a version of the agreed route, taking into account varying distances, seasonal conditions and war zones. For instance, the route "Auckland to London" could be via Suez, Panama, the Cape of Good Hope, or Cape Horn, but the usual route will be identified by reference to current practice or to the parties' previous dealings.
The English common law of deviation is establish by two cases, Glynn v Margetson[1] and Leduc v Ward [2].
In Glynn v Margetson a vessel was to carry a perishable consignment of Seville marmalade oranges from Malaga to Liverpool. The contract included a "liberty clause" which allowed the vessel "liberty to proceed and stay at any ports in any rotation in the Mediterranean, Levant, Black sea or Adriatic, or on the coasts of Africa, Spain, Portugal or France.." On leaving Malaga, the vessel did not head straight for Liverpool, but made her way to Burriana, 350 miles up the coast. As a result of the delay, the cargo had deteriorated by the time it reached England. The House of Lords (establishing the so-called "main purpose rule", held that the clause, if given full effect, would defeat the main purpose of the contract and would be, in effect, an exemption clause which could be ignored. They gave the clause a limited construction, namely that the vessel could have liberty to proceed and stay at any ports on the voyage from Malaga to Liverpool, such as Cadiz or Lisbon.[3]
In Leduc v Ward, a vessel was to voyage from Fiume (modern day Rijeka) to Dunkirk. The bill of lading gave "liberty to call at any ports in any order". She did not proceed to Dunkirk, but headed for Glasgow, and was lost in a storm near Ailsa Craig. Just as in Glynn v Margetson, the Court of Appeal held that the deviation was unjustifiable and was not permitted by the liberty clause, so the carrier was liable for the lost cargo. [4] (Had the court held that the deviation was justified, the carrier would have avoided liability as the storm would have been an "Act of God"). Even though it was accepted that the shipper had been verbally informed that the vessel might make passage to Glasgow, this evidence was not admissible, because the parol evidence rule prevents recourse to extraneous evidence when construing a written document. Using the criteria of differential bargaining strength of the parties, whereby the carrier is usually deemed to have greater bargaining power than the shipper, note that the parol evidence rule may be relaxed if a shipper (rather than the carrier) seeks to rely on any verbal promises of the carrier.
Insurance regarding voyages and shipment
In the case of an insured voyage or shipment, deviation is a voluntary departure, without necessity, or any reasonable cause, from the regular and usual course of the voyage insured.
From the moment this happens, the voyage is changed, the contract determined, and the insurer discharged from all subsequent responsibility. By the contract the insurer only runs the risk of the contract agreed upon, and no other; and it is, therefore, a condition implied in the policy, that the ship shall proceed to her port of destination by the shortest and safest course (or usual course), and on no account to deviate from that course, but in cases of necessity.
The effect of a deviation is not to vitiate or avoid the policy, but only to determine the liability of the underwriters from the time of the deviation. If, therefore, the ship or goods, after the voyage has commenced, receive damage, then the ship deviates, and afterwards a loss happen, there, though the insurer is discharged from the time of the deviation, and is not answerable for the subsequent loss, yet he is bound to make good the damage sustained previous to the deviation. But though he is thus discharged from subsequent responsibility, he is entitled to retain the whole premium.
What amounts to a deviation is not easily defined, but a departure from the usual course of the voyage, or remaining at places where the ship is authorized to touch, longer than necessary, or doing there what the insured is not authorized to do; as, if the ship have merely liberty to touch at a point, and the insured stay there to trade, or break bulk, it is a deviation.
The "course of the voyage" is not meant to be the shortest course the ship can take from her port of departure to her port of destination, but the regular and customary track, if such there be, which long usage has proved to be the safest and most convenient.
A deviation that will discharge the insurer must be a voluntary departure from the usual course of the voyage insured, and not warranted by any necessity. If a deviation can be justified by necessity, it will not affect the contract; and necessity will justify a deviation, though it proceed from a cause not insured against. The cases of necessity which are most frequently adduced to justify a departure from the direct or usual course of the voyage, are
- Stress of weather,
- The want of necessary repairs,
- Joining convoy,
- Succoring ships in distress,
- Avoiding capture or detention,
- Sickness of the ship's master or mariner, and
- Mutiny of the crew.
