Editing Contracts/Deviation
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==Establishing the doctrine== | ==Establishing the doctrine== | ||
Deviation in carriage of goods by sea is treated as a serious breach because it undermines the carrier's prime duty to the shipper of the cargo, namely to carry the cargo to its destination will "all due despatch".<ref> | Deviation in carriage of goods by sea is treated as a serious breach because it undermines the carrier's prime duty to the shipper of the cargo, namely to carry the cargo to its destination will "all due despatch".<ref>[[Hadley v Baxendale]] (1854) 9 ex 341</ref> | ||
The English common law of deviation is establish by two cases, ''[[Glynn v Margetson]]'' <ref> | The English common law of deviation is establish by two cases, ''[[Glynn v Margetson]]'' <ref>Glynn v Margetson 1893 AC351</ref> and ''[[Leduc v Ward]]''.<ref>Leduc v Ward 1888 20 QBD 475</ref> | ||
In ''Glynn v Margetson'' (1893), a vessel was to carry a perishable consignment of Seville marmalade oranges from Malaga to Liverpool. The contract included a "liberty clause" which allowed the vessel "liberty to proceed and stay at any ports in any rotation in the Mediterranean, Levant, Black sea or Adriatic, or on the coasts of Africa, Spain, Portugal or France.." On leaving Malaga, the vessel did not head straight for Liverpool, but made her way to Burriana, 350 miles up the coast. As a result of the delay, the cargo had deteriorated by the time it reached England. The [[Judicial functions of the House of Lords|House of Lords]] (establishing the so-called "main purpose rule"), held that the clause, if given full effect, would defeat the main purpose of the contract and would be, in effect, an exemption clause which should be ignored. They gave the clause a limited construction, namely that the vessel could have liberty to proceed and stay only at ports reasonably close to the agreed route from Malaga to Liverpool, such as Cadiz or Lisbon.<ref>Cases & Materials on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd edition - Martin Dockray - {{ISBN|1-85941-796-5}}</ref> | In ''Glynn v Margetson'' (1893), a vessel was to carry a perishable consignment of Seville marmalade oranges from Malaga to Liverpool. The contract included a "liberty clause" which allowed the vessel "liberty to proceed and stay at any ports in any rotation in the Mediterranean, Levant, Black sea or Adriatic, or on the coasts of Africa, Spain, Portugal or France.." On leaving Malaga, the vessel did not head straight for Liverpool, but made her way to Burriana, 350 miles up the coast. As a result of the delay, the cargo had deteriorated by the time it reached England. The [[Judicial functions of the House of Lords|House of Lords]] (establishing the so-called "main purpose rule"), held that the clause, if given full effect, would defeat the main purpose of the contract and would be, in effect, an exemption clause which should be ignored. They gave the clause a limited construction, namely that the vessel could have liberty to proceed and stay only at ports reasonably close to the agreed route from Malaga to Liverpool, such as Cadiz or Lisbon.<ref>Cases & Materials on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd edition - Martin Dockray - {{ISBN|1-85941-796-5}}</ref> |