Antitrust: Difference between revisions
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Generally, only the "direct purchaser" may have standing to sue for antitrust injury. In [[Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois]], an indirect purchaser of concrete blocks attempted to sue the manufacturer of the blocks. The blocks had come to the purchaser through two levels in the supply chain. The indirect purchaser was found to not have been injured by the alleged antitrust violations. | Generally, only the "direct purchaser" may have standing to sue for antitrust injury. In [[Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois]], an indirect purchaser of concrete blocks attempted to sue the manufacturer of the blocks. The blocks had come to the purchaser through two levels in the supply chain. The indirect purchaser was found to not have been injured by the alleged antitrust violations. | ||
One policy rationale behind the direct purchaser requirement is that | One policy rationale behind the direct purchaser requirement is that there are many indirect purchasers compared to the number of direct purchasers, which spreads out the damage more. Less damage per purchaser spells out less incentive to sue for recovery than the direct, larger-volume purchaser has. | ||
==== Antitrust Injury ==== | ==== Antitrust Injury ==== | ||
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The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be “the type of loss that claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.” | The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be “the type of loss that claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.” | ||
==== "Business or Property ==== | |||
A plaintiff suing for antitrust recovery under section 4 of the Clayton Act myst allege injury to "business or property." Sometimes this means that plaintiff must have an injury to a "commercial injury." In [[Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.]], the defendant argued that "business or property" means only commercial business (commercial interests or enterprises), but the holding said that "business or property" means personal property or interest as well. | |||
==== Standing to Sue ==== | |||
For one to have standing, a nexus must exist between the plaintiff's harm and the alleged violation. [[Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready]] describes that the court looks for a physical and economic connection between the violation alleged and the harm caused. There are several | |||
;Factors of importance: | |||
:Remoteness | |||
:Foreseeability | |||
:If the injury plaintiff suffered was inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict | |||
[[Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters]] | |||
===Additional Antitrust Defenses=== | ===Additional Antitrust Defenses=== | ||
Revision as of 03:06, December 21, 2006
This Antitrust Outline only has the framework to which the substance needs to be added. If you are so inclined, please feel free!
Introduction to the Competition Model
Policies and Goals of Antitrust Regulation
Common Law
Framework for Analysis
Economic Problem
Market in Movement
Judicial Emphasis on Economic Reasoning
Special Problems of Antitrust Enforcement
Enforcement
Direct Purchaser
Generally, only the "direct purchaser" may have standing to sue for antitrust injury. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, an indirect purchaser of concrete blocks attempted to sue the manufacturer of the blocks. The blocks had come to the purchaser through two levels in the supply chain. The indirect purchaser was found to not have been injured by the alleged antitrust violations.
One policy rationale behind the direct purchaser requirement is that there are many indirect purchasers compared to the number of direct purchasers, which spreads out the damage more. Less damage per purchaser spells out less incentive to sue for recovery than the direct, larger-volume purchaser has.
Antitrust Injury
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. tells us that antitrust injury must come "'by reason of' that which made the acquisitions unlawful." What makes the acquisition unlawful is injury to competition.
The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be “the type of loss that claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.”
"Business or Property
A plaintiff suing for antitrust recovery under section 4 of the Clayton Act myst allege injury to "business or property." Sometimes this means that plaintiff must have an injury to a "commercial injury." In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the defendant argued that "business or property" means only commercial business (commercial interests or enterprises), but the holding said that "business or property" means personal property or interest as well.
Standing to Sue
For one to have standing, a nexus must exist between the plaintiff's harm and the alleged violation. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready describes that the court looks for a physical and economic connection between the violation alleged and the harm caused. There are several
- Factors of importance
- Remoteness
- Foreseeability
- If the injury plaintiff suffered was inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict
Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters
